[Crypto-chi] Hardware tokens

Sat Dec 27 14:50:00 CST 2014

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Hi all,

I just picked up a FIDO U2F Security Key. I'll report my findings at
the next cryptoparty/CCC. Having to remember passwords is WYFU.

> This is known as key escrow, and it's a bad thing if you don't 
> trust your escrow service (and why should you?) Lockheed was bitten
> by

Actually your sentence could be better written as: "This is known as
key escrow and its a bad thing.

CCC will be mid/late-January

On 12/23/2014 05:10 PM, Jesse Young wrote:
> I remember the SecurID breach, but only looked up the details
> recently. I doesn't look like there was a problem with the token
> itself, rather RSA (the company) kept a copy of all the secrets
> resident on the tokens. This is known as key escrow, and it's a bad
> thing if you don't trust your escrow service (and why should you?)
> Lockheed was bitten by it. Really the only parties that should have
> had the secret were Lockheed and their employees (with the
> employee's copy locked up in the token.)
> 
> Shared secret tokens (like the SecurID) are also less of an
> interest to me, because the secret, by definition, needs to be
> available to the service you're authenticating against. It does
> seem to be more popular on the web these days (see Google
> Authenticator / OATH). I have it set up for my email.
> 
> I think the hardware tokens can be made secure precluding poor 
> implementations. In fact some cryptoprocessors have anti-tampering 
> features that are purported to defend against highly sophisticated 
> and expensive attacks.
> 
> FWIW, everything I know about the SecurID breach came from this 
> Slashdot discussion: 
> http://yro.slashdot.org/story/11/06/07/129217/rsa-admits-securid-tokens-have-been-compromised
>
>  Tell me more about the CCC, is there a separate mailing list /
> resources from the cryptoparty's?
> 
> Jesse
> 
> On Tue, 23 Dec 2014 14:08:15 -0600 Matt Chapman <mchap88 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> On-topic: With hardware tokens, never forget: 
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SecurID#March_2011_system_compromise
>>
>>
>> 
Off-topic-ish:
>> How's CCC going? I'd love to go to one, but haven't heard much
>> about it since the last crypto party.
>> 
>> Matt
>> 
>> On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Freddy Martinez 
>> <freddymartinez9 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Off-topic: lol. GSM SIM cards are not secure.
>>> 
>>> On-topic
>>> 
>>> I love this topic. I have been looking at hardware tokens out
>>> of curiosity for work and have a few ideas as well. I'd love to
>>> see something like this Jesse.  My concern is that this would
>>> be out of scope for cryptoparty but we could do something like
>>> this at CCC. The goal for CCC was to do more advanced level
>>> talks and create a place for working on projects like this.
>>> 
>>> Freddy
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Jesse Young <jlyo at jlyo.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>> Hey all,
>>>> 
>>>> I've taken an interest in hardware based security tokens on
>>>> Linux lately. Let's just say it's a big painful mess of
>>>> components that don't quite work together [1]. I've come up
>>>> with a set of requirements for my personal setup that I think
>>>> are achievable, although it has and will take quite a bit of
>>>> work. I've surveyed the ecosystem, and came up with a set of
>>>> requirements that I think are achievable.
>>>> 
>>>> My requirements are: 1. All secrets must be stored or wrapped
>>>> in hardware 2. All secret keys must be unextractable 3. New
>>>> key generation must be done in hardware 4. Existing keys must
>>>> be able to be imported into hardware
>>>> 
>>>> As far as application integration goes, here are my ideas: 1.
>>>> Linux PAM (authentication and single-sign-on) 2. LUKS disk
>>>> encryption 3. OpenSSH 4. GnuPG 5. Web browser client cert
>>>> (Chromium and/or Firefox) 6. X.509 certificate authority 7.
>>>> Kerberos auth for work (not very familiar with this one) 8.
>>>> OATH time and HMAC one-time-passwords
>>>> 
>>>> I have a TPM in my laptop, and access to an Aladdin eToken
>>>> 32k 4.2b to play around with at work. I also bought a
>>>> smartcard reader, and have been exploring GSM SIM cards and a
>>>> Bank of America EMV (chip credit card). So far most of my
>>>> success has been with the TPM, namely SSH keys [2] and the
>>>> X.509 CA. I haven't been able to generate useful keys on the
>>>> eToken.
>>>> 
>>>> I have (5) implemented against OpenDNSSEC's SoftHSM, although
>>>> it fails all the requirements since it's a software solution.
>>>> The value, however, is that I can isolate the key in a
>>>> separate user and process, similar to ssh-agent or gpg-agent.
>>>> The interface to SoftHSM is PKCS#11 which is common among
>>>> hardware PKI tokens.
>>>> 
>>>> This brings me to my next idea: the Yubikey NEO [2]. It's a
>>>> USB device that seems to have a bit of a following and
>>>> support. Does anyone have experience and opinions with this
>>>> device (or other hardware tokens)? The Yubikey NEO looks like
>>>> it can integrate with most the applications I have.
>>>> 
>>>> I'm at a point where I can start writing a presentation about
>>>> all this with some confidence. When's the next cryptoparty
>>>> when I should have it ready by?
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks, Jesse
>>>> 
>>>> [1]
>>>> 
>>> https://blog.flameeyes.eu/2011/04/network-security-services-nss-and-pkcs-11
>>>>
>>> 
[2] https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/yubikey-neo/
>>>> 
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>>>> http://groups.sshchicago.org/listinfo/cryptoparty-chi
>>>> 
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> 
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